The ellipsoid algorithm is a fundamental algorithm for computing a solution to the system of m linear inequalities in n variables (P ) : A ⊤ x ≤ u when the set of solutions P := {x ∈ R n : A ⊤ x ≤ u} has positive volume. However, when (P ) is infeasible, the ellipsoid algorithm has no built-in mechanism for proving that (P ) is infeasible. This is in contrast to the other two fundamental algorithms for tackling (P ), namely the simplex method and interior-point methods, each of which can be easily implemented in a way that either produces a solution of (P ) or proves that (P ) is infeasible by producing a solution to the alternative system (Alt) : Aλ = 0, u ⊤ λ < 0, λ ≥ 0. Motivated by this, we develop an Oblivious Ellipsoid Algorithm (OEA) that produces a solution of (P ) when (P ) is feasible and produces a solution of (Alt) when (P ) is infeasible, and whose operations complexity dependence on the dimensions (which we describe as dimension complexity below) in the regime m ≫ n is on the same order as a standard ellipsoid method (O(m 4 )) when (P ) is infeasible (but has worse dimension complexity when (P ) is feasible). However, if one is only interested in proving infeasibility and not necessarily producing a solution of (Alt), then we show that a simplified version of OEA achieves O(m 3 n) dimension complexity, which is superior to the O(m 4 ) dimension complexity bound of a standard ellipsoid algorithm applied to solve (Alt).
is infeasible. ( We use the real number model of computation throughout this paper. In the bit model of computation the ellipsoid method will correctly decide infeasibility even though it will not produce a solution of a dual/alternative system -instead a volume argument is used to prove infeasibility; see [6] .) By a certificate of infeasibility we informally mean a mathematical object that yields a proof that (P ) is infeasible. For example, when and only when (P ) is infeasible, there exists a solution λ ∈ R m to the alternative system (Alt) below, which we formally call a type-L certificate of infeasibility:
Type-L Certificate of Infeasibility. If λ ∈ R m satisfies:
(Alt) :
then it is simple to demonstrate (P ) is infeasible. We refer to a solution to (Alt) as a type-L certificate of infeasibility in order to distinguish it from other certificates of infeasibility for (P ) that will be developed herein. We view a type-L certificate of infeasibility as special because -like a solution to (P ) -it is a solution to a particular linear inequality system (namely (Alt)), it does not require excessive storage (m coefficients), and the computation involved in verifying (Alt) is not excessive (O(mn) operations). The two other fundamental algorithms for tackling (P ), namely the simplex algorithm and interior-point methods, each can be implemented in a way that either produces a solution to (P ) or certifies that (P ) is infeasible by producing a solution to (Alt), which has begged the question of whether such a version of the ellipsoid method can be developed [12] .
The above discussion motivates the following two challenges, the oblivious linear certification challenge and the oblivious determination challenge:
Challenge I (Oblivious Linear Certification). Develop a version of the ellipsoid algorithm that produces a feasible solution of (P ) when (P ) is feasible, and produces a type-L certificate of infeasibility, i.e., a solution of (Alt), when (P ) is infeasible.
Challenge II (Oblivious Determination). Develop a version of the ellipsoid algorithm that produces a feasible solution of (P ) when (P ) is feasible, and otherwise proves infeasibility by correctly detecting that (P ) is infeasible. When (P ) is feasible, both Challenges I and II require producing a solution of (P ). But when (P ) is not feasible, Challenge I requires producing a type-L certificate of infeasibility, whereas Challenge II only requires proving infeasibility -though not necessarily producing a type-L certificate.
Of course, one could address Challenge I or Challenge II by running the standard ellipsoid method in parallel simultaneously on (P ) and (Alt). That is, one could perform (one operation at a time) one operation of the ellipsoid algorithm applied to (P ) followed by one operation of the ellipsoid algorithm applied to (Alt), and then stop when one of the two algorithms produces a solution. (Equivalently, one could run each algorithm on a separate machine.) However, there is an aesthetic interest in developing a single oblivious ellipsoid algorithm (which we call OEA) that will either produce a solution of (P ) or prove that (P ) is infeasible by producing a solution of (Alt). Such a version would elevate the ellipsoid algorithm to be "on par" with the other two fundamental algorithms for solving (P ) in this regard, namely the simplex method and interior-point methods, each of which can be easily implemented in a way that either produces a solution of (P ) or proves that (P ) is infeasible by producing a solution of (Alt).
It also turns out that there are complexity implications regarding the development of an oblivious ellipsoid algorithm as we will point out in Section 8. Indeed, in the regime m ≫ n, a simpler version of our oblivious ellipsoid algorithm is more efficient than the parallel approach suggested above for solving Challenge II in the case when (P ) is infeasible. This simpler version does not iteratively update the information needed to produce a type-L certificate of infeasibility. It still proves infeasibility, but does not produce a solution of (Alt), and hence we refer to it as algorithm OEA-No-Alt. In the case when (P ) is infeasible, the dimension complexity of OEA-No-Alt is O(m 3 n) while the dimension complexity of running the standard ellipsoid algorithm in parallel is O((m − n) 4 ) = O(m 4 ). This new complexity result is developed in Section 8.
Before presenting a schematic of OEA and stating our main results, we first need to develop some relevant concepts and related notation. We will make the following assumption about the data throughout this paper: Assumption 1.1. The conic hull of the columns of A is equal to R n , namely {Aλ : λ ≥ 0} = R n , and each of the columns a 1 , ..., a m of A has unit Euclidean norm.
The first part of Assumption 1.1 ensures that (P ) is bounded if (P ) is feasible. Note that Assumption 1.1 implies that m > n and that A has rank n. The second part of Assumption 1.1 is without loss of generality because feasible solutions of (P ) do not change under positive rescaling of the constraints of (P ), and any zero a j 's either yield redundant constraints or immediate proofs of infeasibility.
We will suppose that for each i ∈ {1, ..., m} we know a lower bound ℓ i ∈ R that informally satisfies x ∈ P ⇒ a ⊤ i x ≥ ℓ i . (When (P ) is infeasible, any ℓ i ∈ R satisfies this implication vacuously.) Accordingly, if (P ) is feasible and we know lower bounds ℓ 1 , . . . , ℓ m , then we know how to bound a ⊤ i x for x ∈ P since u i is an upper bound for a ⊤ i x over all x ∈ P); see Figure 1 .
In fact, we will suppose more strongly that for each i ∈ {1, ..., m} we know ℓ i and λ i ∈ R m that satisfy:
, and observe that when (P ) is feasible, it follows from (LB i ) that any x ∈ P satisfies
e., λ i certifies the lower bound ℓ i on a ⊤ i x over all x ∈ P. We will define ℓ i to be a certified lower bound for constraint i of (P ) with certificate λ i ∈ R m if ℓ i and λ i together satisfy (LB i ).
In general, it is not such an easy task to construct such lower bounds ℓ and certificates Λ -short of solving systems of inequalities of size at least as large as that of (P ). However, in the often-occurring case when (P ) contains box constraints (of the form b ≤ x ≤b), such lower bounds and certificates are quite simple to write down, which we show in Section 2.
(Note that, if (P ) is infeasible, any ℓ i is a lower bound. In theory, we can find a solution to (LB i ) by obtaining a nonnegative solution to Aλ = −a i by Assumption 1.1 and then adding to it a suitably large multiple of a solution to (Alt).) It will be convenient to collect the certified lower bounds into ℓ = (ℓ 1 , . . . , ℓ m ) ⊤ ∈ R m and their certificates columnwise into a matrix Λ = [λ 1 | · · · |λ m ] ∈ R m×m , and define ℓ to be a certified lower bound for (P ) with certificate matrix Λ ∈ R m×m if ℓ and Λ satisfy (LB ) :
Just as above, if (P ) is feasible and ℓ is a certified lower bound for (P ) with certificate Λ, then ℓ is a lower bound for A ⊤ x over all x ∈ P because for any x ∈ P it holds that
We can use a certified lower bound ℓ together with d ∈ R m satisfying d > 0 to construct a parametrized ellipsoid E(d, ℓ) that contains P:
. . , m. Using some elementary algebraic manipulation, we can re-write E(d, ℓ) as:
where
and we see from (2) that y(d, ℓ) is the center of the ellipsoid E(d, ℓ), ADA ⊤ is the so-called shape matrix, and f (d, ℓ) captures the scale factor of the ellipsoid.
The representation (1)-(2) was introduced by Burrell and Todd [2] to generate dual variables in the ellipsoid method. They developed a variant of the standard ellipsoid method with deep cuts that represented each ellipsoid in the form E(d, ℓ) (with d ≥ 0, not necessarily positive); the difference was that sometimes it was necessary to update the lower bounds and hence shrink the current ellipsoid before applying the standard deep cut update.
In the Oblivious Ellipsoid Algorithm that we develop in this paper, we will also update the ellipsoid E(d, ℓ) by updating its parameters (d, ℓ) → (d,l) (as opposed to explicitly updating the center and shape matrix as is done in the conventional ellipsoid algorithm). Hence ℓ (and its certification matrix Λ) should be thought of as parameters that are given an initial value and then are updated in the course of running the algorithm. We will also maintain d positive throughout.
Our Oblivious Ellipsoid Algorithm will update ℓ in synch with updates of Λ so that the updated ℓ is always certified by the updated Λ. For motivation why OEA updates ℓ and Λ, suppose at a given iteration we have ℓ that is certified by Λ and it holds that ℓ j satisfies ℓ j > u j for some j ∈ {1, ..., m} (so that clearly (P ) is infeasible). Then it is straightforward to verify (see Burrell and Todd [2] , and also Corollary 5.1 here) thatλ j := λ j + e j is feasible for (Alt) and so is a type-L certificate of infeasibility. This will be our main method for constructing a type-L certificate of infeasibility in our algorithm, so we state this result formally as follows.
Remark 1.1. Suppose ℓ j is a certified lower bound for inequality j with certificate λ j , and that ℓ j > u j . Then (P ) is infeasible, andλ j := λ j + e j is feasible for (Alt) and hence is a type-L certificate of infeasibility.
We can also use ℓ and Λ satisfying (LB ) to construct certificates of infeasibility that are different from a type-L certificate. Let us show two ways that this can be done, which we will call type-Q and type-E certificates of infeasibility, respectively.
Type-Q Certificate of Infeasibility. Let d ∈ R m such that d > 0, and let ℓ be a certified lower bound for (P ) with certificate matrix Λ. It follows from (1) and (2) 
comprise a certificate of infeasibility, which we will refer to as a type-Q certificate of infeasibility. (And later in this paper, we will show how to construct a type-L certificate of infeasibility from a type-Q certificate of infeasibility; see Proposition 5.3.)
Type-E Certificate of Infeasibility. Let d ∈ R m such that d > 0, and let ℓ be a certified lower bound for (P ) with certificate matrix Λ. Suppose that f (d, ℓ) > 0, whereby from (2) it follows that E(d, ℓ) has positive volume. It then follows from (1) and (2) that if there exists j ∈ {1, ..., m} satisfying
namely every point in E(d, ℓ) violates constraint j of (P ), then (P ) is infeasible (see Figure  2 ). Now notice that
Thus d ∈ R m , ℓ ∈ R m , Λ ∈ R m×m , and j ∈ {1, ..., m} that satisfy
comprise a certificate of infeasibility of (P ), which we will refer to as a type-E certificate of infeasibility. Burrell and Todd [2] show how to construct a type-L certificate of infeasibility from a type-E certificate of infeasibility, which we will review in Proposition 5.1 and Corollary 5.1.
We note that there can of course be many other types of certificates of infeasibility beyond the three types just described.
Schematic of the Oblivious Ellipsoid Algorithm
Algorithm 1 below is an informal schematic of our Oblivious Ellipsoid Algorithm. (For the full algorithm description of OEA, see Algorithm 4 and the surrounding discussion.)
Algorithm 1 Schematic of Oblivious Ellipsoid Algorithm (OEA) Input: data A and u, certified lower bound ℓ for (P ) with certificate matrix Λ, and d > 0. The iterates of Algorithm 1 are d, ℓ, and Λ. In Step 1, we perform a "standard" ellipsoid algorithm step where we check if the center y(d, ℓ) of the ellipsoid E(d, ℓ) is a feasible solution of (P ), and if so we output y(d, ℓ) and stop. If we proceed to Step 2, then A ⊤ y(d, ℓ) ≤ u. In Step 2, we check if f (d, ℓ) ≤ 0, and if this holds, then d, ℓ, and Λ comprise a type-Q certificate of infeasibility, from which we can construct a type-L certificate of infeasibility (as will be shown in Proposition 5.3). In Step 3 we perform another standard ellipsoid algorithm step wherein we compute the index of the most violated constraint. (Actually, in the standard ellipsoid method it is sufficient to compute the index of any violated constraint, but computing the most violated constraint will be crucial for establishing the convergence guarantee of the Oblivious Ellipsoid Algorithm when (P ) is infeasible.) In Step 4, we possibly update the lower bound certificate λ j if the update certifies a better lower bound than the largest lower bound currently certified. In Step 5, we check if min x∈E(d,ℓ) a ⊤ j x j > u j , and if this condition is satisfied, then d, ℓ, and Λ comprise a type-E certificate of infeasibility, from which we can construct and return a type-L certificate of infeasibility (as will be shown in Proposition 5.1 and Corollary 5.1). In Step 6, we update the ellipsoid E(d, ℓ) by computing new values (d,l) of the parameters of E(·, ·) which replace the current values (d, ℓ) in Step 7.
Summary of Main Results
We briefly summarize our main results concerning the Oblivious Ellipsoid Algorithm. In the case when (P ) is infeasible, OEA will compute a type-L certificate of infeasibility in
iterations, where ℓ is the initial lower bound for (P ) certified by the initial Λ, and τ (A, u) is a geometric condition number that naturally captures the extent of feasibility or infeasibility of (P ); see Theorem 7.1 as well as Corollary 7.1 which specializes the above bound to the case where (P ) contains box constraints. Each iteration of OEA requires O(m 2 ) operations, hence the total dimension complexity of OEA when (P ) is infeasible is O(m 4 ).
In the case when (P ) is feasible, OEA will compute a solution of (P ) in
iterations, where ℓ is the initial certified lower bound for (P ) certified by the initial Λ, ρ(A) is a geometric condition measure which captures the distance to unboundedness of (P ), and τ (A, u) is the geometric condition measure mentioned above (which corresponds to the radius of the largest inscribed ball in the feasible region P in the feasible case); see Theorem 7.2 as well as Corollary 7.2 which specializes the above bound to the case where (P ) contains box constraints (in which case ρ(A) plays no role). Since each iteration of OEA requires O(m 2 ) operations, the total dimension complexity of OEA when (P ) is feasible is O(m 3 n).
The iteration bound in the feasible case follows from standard volume-reduction arguments. However, in the infeasible case the iteration bound follows from a proof that at each iteration a novel potential function is reduced. The introduction of this potential function is another contribution of our paper; see Section 7.1.
Let us compare the dimension complexity bounds above to the strategy of running the standard ellipsoid algorithm in parallel simultaneously on (P ) and (Alt), which we refer to as the "parallel ellipsoid scheme". The first two rows of Table 1 presents the relevant bounds in this comparison. In the case when (P ) is feasible, the parallel ellipsoid scheme has superior computational complexity over OEA -O(mn 3 ) rather than O(m 3 n) total operations. In the case when (P ) is infeasible, and in the regime when m ≫ n, the two methods have comparable dimension complexity, namely O(m 4 ) operations.
We also present a "simplified" version of OEA, which we call OEA-No-Alt, that rather surprisingly leads to a new dimension complexity bound for the ellipsoid algorithm for correctly detecting when (P ) is infeasible. Here we briefly describe this version and its dimension complexity. Recall from earlier in this section that OEA maintains at each iteration a lower bound vector ℓ that is certified by a corresponding certificate matrix Λ, and that ℓ and Λ are updated at each iteration. It turns out that the certificate matrix Λ is not actually used anywhere in the computations in the algorithm; rather its sole purpose is to produce a Type-L certificate of infeasibility (a solution of (Alt)) after such infeasibility is detected. If one is only interested in solving Challenge II, i.e., correctly detecting infeasibility (but not necessarily producing a solution of (Alt)), then the updates of Λ in OEA can be removed 
Differences between Oblivious Ellipsoid Algorithm and the Standard Ellipsoid
Algorithm. We did not see a way to use a standard version of the ellipsoid algorithm to solve Challenge I or II. In particular, standard versions are designed to decrease the volume of the ellipsoid as much as possible at each iteration (by computing the minimum volume ellipsoid that contains the current half-ellipsoid), and we found this to be detrimental to establishing any type of guarantee when (P ) is infeasible. Accordingly, we develop an alternative way to update ellipsoids (see Remark 6.1) that sufficiently decreases the volume (to obtain a guarantee when (P ) is feasible) while also decreasing the value of a certain potential function that we introduce that is related to infeasibility measures. Like the volume of a full-dimensional polytope, the potential is bounded from below, which allows us to establish a guarantee when (P ) is infeasible; see Section 7.1 for the details.
Literature Review
The ellipsoid method was introduced by Yudin and Nemirovsky [14] in their study of the complexity of convex optimization, and then famously used by Khachiyan [7] to show that linear programming (in the bit model) was polynomial-time bounded. Both Yudin-Nemirovsky and Khachiyan used a varying coordinate system to describe their ellipsoids, but Gács and Lovász in their exposition of the method [5] and almost all subsequent authors used the representation {x ∈ R n : (x − y) ⊤ g −1 (x − y) ≤ 1} in terms of the center y and the shape matrix G. Many authors developed improvements involving deep and two-sided cuts; see the survey paper [1] and its references. Most research concentrated on linear programming, although there was a substantial research effort devoted to consequences in combinatorial optimization (see Grötschel, Lovász, and Schrijver [6] ), and Ecker and Kupferschmid showed the effectiveness of the method on medium-sized nonlinear programming problems [4] .
Here we are concerned with the linear case, and indeed just with linear inequalities. In the literature on linear programming, most variants of the ellipsoid method just describe the updates to the center y and the shape matrix G. In proving that the formulae for twosided cut variants gave minimum-volume ellipsoids, Todd [11] showed that the new quadratic inequality was a convex combination of that defining the old ellipsoid and one requiring the solution to lie between the two hyperplanes defining the two-sided cut. This insight led later to the Burrell-Todd representation described above [2] .
We also mention a variant of the ellipsoid method which also encloses the feasible region in a sequence of convex bodies whose volumes decrease geometrically. This is the "simplex" method of Yamnitsky and Levin [13] , which uses simplices instead of ellipsoids. The volume reduction is much smaller than with the ellipsoid method (O(exp(n −2 ) instead of O(exp(n −1 ))), but ours may be too (O(exp(m −1 ))). This method also, like the Burrell-Todd variant of the ellipsoid method and ours, maintains a certificate that it contains the feasible region, but we are not aware of research on its complexity in detecting infeasibility.
Organization
In Section 2 we show how to easily construct initial lower bounds and certificates when (P ) contains box constraints. In Section 3 we further review the ellipsoid parametrization (namely (1) and (2)) of [2] and we introduce ellipsoid slab radii, which will be an important geometric concept in the setting when (P ) is infeasible. In Section 4 we introduce the condition number τ (A, u) that captures the extent of feasibility or infeasibility of a system of (P ), and we also introduce the condition measure ρ(A) that measures the distance to unboundedness of (P ). In Section 5 we review and further develop a method for updating certificates for lower bounds developed initially in [2] . In Section 6 we develop our mechanism for updating the ellipsoids from one iteration to the next. In Section 7 we formally state our algorithm along with convergence guarantees for the feasible and the infeasible cases. Lastly, in Section 8 we present a simplified version of OEA which we denote as OEA-No-Alt along with its complexity analysis. Most of the proofs are in the Appendix at the end of the paper.
Notation
The ℓ p norm is denoted · p for 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞, and the operator norm of a matrix M is denoted by M a,b = max v a =1 Mv b . For convenience we denote the Euclidean (ℓ 2 ) norm simply by · . For d ∈ R m , we use D to denote the diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries correspond to the entries of d. If not obvious from context, we use 0 k to denote the k-dimensional vector of zeros, and I k×k to denote the identity matrix in R k×k . Let e i denote the i th unit vector, whose dimension is dictated by context, and let e = (1, . . . , 1), whose dimension is also dictated by context. We use [k] := {1, . . . , k}. For a given k-dimensional vector v, the positive and negative componentwise parts of v are denoted by v + and v − , respectively, and satisfy v
To save physical space, we use the notation [u; v; w] to denote the concatenation of column vectors u, v, w into a single new column vector.
Initializing lower bounds and certificates for systems with box constraints
The variant of the ellipsoid method that we develop in this paper is premised on having an initial vector of lower bounds ℓ with associated initial certificate matrix Λ for the linear inequalities defining (P ). In general, it is not clear how to construct such lower bounds and certificates -short of solving related systems of inequalities of size at least as large as that of the original system. However, in the often-occurring case when the linear inequality system defining (P ) contains box constraints, such lower bounds and certificates are easy to write down. Suppose that the linear inequality system is given with box constraints, namely:
and we can assume without loss of generality that:
(as otherwise constraint i would be redundant and can be removed). Let us now see how to conveniently write down certified lower bounds and certificates for the system A ⊤ x ≤ u defined above. For i ∈ [m] definel i ∈ R to be:
andl := (l 1 , . . . ,l m ); then it is straightforward to show that
is a valid lower bound vector for the system A ⊤ x ≤ u defined above in (3)-(4). We construct the certificate λ i of constraint i of A ⊤ x ≤ u as follows. For i = 1, ...,m, define
for i =m + 1, ...,m + n, define λ i = 0m ; 0 n ; e i ,
and for i =m + n + 1, ...,m + 2n, define
It is then straightforward to check that Λ = [λ 1 | . . . |λ m ] defined by (8-10) is a certificate for the lower bounds ℓ defined in (7) . In summary, given a system of inequalities with box constraints (P B ), we can conveniently re-write the system in the format A ⊤ x ≤ u and we can easily construct initial certified lower bounds ℓ along with an associated certificate matrix Λ. We can also assume without loss of generality that l i ≤ u i for i ∈ [m], for otherwise we can easily construct a type-L certificate of infeasibility. Last of all, and somewhat separately, we will need the following result which is straightforward to show as a consequence of (5), (6) , and Assumption 1.1:
where u and ℓ are defined as in (4) and (7), respectively.
Containing ellipsoids, and ellipsoid slab radii
We re-present the ellipsoid parameterization originally developed in Burrell and Todd [2] , and we introduce the geometric notion of slab radii γ 1 , . . . , γ m associated with a given parameterized ellipsoid, for all i ∈ [m].
For ℓ ∈ R m and d ∈ R m with d > 0, define the ellipsoid:
(where D is the diagonal matrix corresponding to d), and note that E(d, ℓ) has the following properties:
1. E(d, ℓ) is bounded; this follows because from Assumption 1.1 the columns of A span R n and hence ADA ⊤ is positive definite.
2. If ℓ is a certified lower bound for (P ) with some certificate Λ, then (P ) is contained in the ellipsoid E(d, ℓ).
We say that E(d, ℓ) is strictly feasible if E(d, ℓ) has an interior, i.e., there exists x satisfying
Let us define the following quantities:
and notice that y(d, ℓ) and t(d, ℓ) are invariant under positive scaling of d. It is straightforward to verify the following alternative characterization of E(d, ℓ) using the above quantities:
Here we see that
is strictly feasible, i.e., f (d, ℓ) > 0, and in light of the fact that E(d, ℓ) is invariant under positive scalings of d, we will often (for arithmetic convenience)
and is so named because γ i (d, ℓ) is the radius γ of the smallest slab of the form {x ∈ R n :
. The ellipsoid slab radius γ i (d, ℓ) has the following properties:
invariant under positive scaling of d, and 2. γ i (d, ℓ) is alternatively characterized as:
Notice that we have only defined γ i (d, ℓ) when E(d, ℓ) is strictly feasible, namely f (d, ℓ) > 0. Of course, we could extend the notions above to the case when f (d, ℓ) = 0 (whereby E(d, ℓ) is the point set {y(d, ℓ)}), but this will not be needed.
Condition Measures of Feasibility, Infeasibility, and Boundedness
We introduce the condition measure τ (A, u) which will be used to measure the extent of feasibility or infeasibility of (P ). Define:
The following proposition lists some of the relevant properties of τ (A, u). Here we use the parametric notation P v := {x ∈ R n : A ⊤ x ≤ v} to keep our statements simple. (b) If P = ∅, then τ (A, u) = −z * > 0 is the smallest scalar θ for which the right-hand-side perturbed system A ⊤ x ≤ u + θe has a feasible solution.
(c) If τ (A, u) = 0, then the linear inequality system (P ) is "ill-posed" in the following sense: for any ε > 0 there exist perturbations ∆b f and ∆b i with ∆b f ∞ ≤ ε, ∆b i ∞ ≤ ε for which P u+∆b f has a strict (interior) solution and P u+∆b i = ∅.
Item (a) above uses the second part of Assumption 1.1 that the columns of A have unit ℓ 2 norm. Regarding (c), the concept of "ill-posedness" in this context was first developed by Renegar [8, 9, 10] ; see Appendix A for further discussion of connections between τ (A, u) and Renegar's condition measureρ(d) and a proof that τ (A, u) ≥ρ(d). Also, τ (A, u) is constructed in a similar spirit to the condition number C(A) for homogeneous linear inequalities developed by Cheung and Cucker [3] . Notice in the case when (P ) is infeasible that for any x ∈ R n there is some constraint that is violated by at least τ (A, u), namely there exists i ∈ [m] for which a ⊤ i x ≥ u i + τ (A, u). We also introduce the following condition measure (in the spirit of Renegar [8] ) which captures the extent to which P is close to unbounded:
Indeed, observe that ρ(A) is the smallest perturbation of the matrix A for which the perturbed feasible region is unbounded.
Updating certificates for lower bounds, and constructing certificates of infeasibility
Let d > 0, and let ℓ be a certified lower bound for (P ) with certificate matrix Λ, and suppose that E(d, ℓ) is strictly feasible, i.e., f (d, ℓ) > 0. Let i ∈ [m] be given. From the definition of the slab radius
and therefore when (P ) is feasible:
and it follows that
is a valid lower bound on constraint i of (P ). This leads to the question of whether and how can one construct a certificateλ i for the lower bound L i ? This question was answered in the affirmative in Burrell and Todd [2] , and we present their solution in the following proposition which shows how to use d, ℓ, and Λ to construct a certificateλ i ∈ R m for the lower bound L i . Proposition 5.1. (see [2] ) Let d > 0, and ℓ be a certified lower bound for (P ) with certificate matrix Λ, let E(d, ℓ) be strictly feasible, and suppose that d has been rescaled so that f (d, ℓ) = 1. Let i ∈ [m] be given, and define L i := a ⊤ i y(d, ℓ) − γ i (d, ℓ), and
Then L i is a certified lower bound on constraint i of (P ) with certificateλ i . In particular, it
For completeness as well for consistency with the notation used in this paper, we present a proof of Proposition 5.1 in Appendix C.1.
As a corollary, we can construct a type-L certificate of infeasibility from a type-E certificate of infeasibility:
Proof. From Proposition 5.1 it holds thatλ is a certificate for the lower bound
The following proposition ties together ellipsoids and slab radii, the condition measure τ (A, u), updates of certificates of lower bounds, and type-L certificates of infeasibility. Proof. If P were nonempty, then a ball of radius τ (A, u) would be contained in a slab of radius γ i (d, ℓ), so that τ (A, u) ≤ γ i (d, ℓ). Hence P = ∅ and so from the definition of τ (A, u) it follows that (13), which implies P = ∅, and we seek to construct a type-L certificate of infeasibility. If f (d, ℓ) = 0, then (13) implies that either P = {y(d, ℓ)} (which is easy to verify by checking if A ⊤ y(d, ℓ) ≤ u) or P = ∅, and in this latter case we again seek a type-L certificate of infeasibility. Below we present Procedure 2, which accomplishes the task of constructing a type-L certificate of infeasibility when f (d, ℓ) ≤ 0 and A ⊤ y(d, ℓ) ≤ u, i.e., constructing a type-L certificate of infeasibility from a type-Q certificate of infeasibility. Steps 2 through 7 of Procedure 2 decrease the i-th and j-th entries of ℓ such that the updated parameterized ellipsoid E(d, ℓ) is strictly feasible and the condition a ⊤ k y(d, ℓ) − γ k (d, ℓ) > u k holds for some index k ∈ [m]. Note that in Step 7 it holds that Λ is still a certificate for the updated lower bounds ℓ because the components of the updated ℓ have either been decreased or remain the same. Steps 8 through 10 use Proposition 5.1 to construct a certificateλ k for the lower bound L k := a ⊤ k y(d, ℓ) − γ k (d, ℓ) that satisfies L k > u k . In Step 11, we returnλ k :=λ k + e k , which by Remark 1.1 is a type-L certificate of infeasibility. 
Updating the ellipsoid E(d, ℓ)
Let d > 0, let ℓ be a certified lower bound for (P ) with certificate Λ, and suppose that the ellipsoid E(d, ℓ) is strictly feasible. Also suppose that d has been scaled so that f (d, ℓ) = 1. In this section, we discuss a procedure for updating the ellipsoid E(d, ℓ). We will assume that the center violates some constraint, i.e., the condition a ⊤ j y(d, ℓ) > u j holds for some j ∈ [m]. Otherwise, y(d, ℓ) is feasible, and so we would have no reason to construct a new ellipsoid. In the same spirit, we will also assume that the condition a ⊤ j y(d, ℓ) − u j ≤ γ j (d, ℓ) holds because if it does not, then we have a type-E certificate of infeasibility and can construct a type-L certificate of infeasibility (see Corollary 5.1), and again we would have no reason to construct a new ellipsoid.
We update the ellipsoid E(d, ℓ) by updating its parameters d and ℓ, and it will be convenient to write the update procedure in five elementary steps. At the end of this section, we will provide some motivation for these steps.
Procedure 3
Updating ellipsoid E(d, ℓ) by updating its parameters d and ℓ Input: d > 0 and certified lower bound ℓ with certificate matrix Λ satisfying f (d, ℓ) = 1, and j ∈ {1, ..., m}.
2: Compute y(d,l). If A ⊤ y(d,l) ≤ u, then Return y(d,l) as a solution to (P ) and Stop.
3: Compute f (d,l ). If f (d,l) ≤ 0, then call Procedure 2 and Stop.
Returnd andl, and Stop.
Below we establish several properties of this procedure. Proofs of the results are in Appendix C.2.
In Step 1 of Procedure 3, we update the j-th coordinate of ℓ to obtain
Note that the numerator above is a ⊤ j y(d, ℓ) − u j > 0, so the jth lower bound is decreased. The effect is that the center of the new ellipsoid E(d, ℓ (1) ) will satisfy the jth inequality at equality, see (19) below. While this may hurt the volume reduction achieved, it is helpful in our analysis of the infeasible case. Lemma 6.1 establishes a few properties of this update. Lemma 6.1. Let d > 0 and let ℓ be a certified lower bound for (P ) with certificate matrix Λ, and suppose that f (d, ℓ) = 1. Let ℓ (1) be defined as in (18). Then ℓ (1) is a lower bound for (P ) with certificate matrix Λ, and the following hold:
From Lemma 6.1 and the suppositions that 0 < a ⊤ j y(d, ℓ) − u j ≤ γ j (d, ℓ), it holds that f (d, ℓ (1) ) ≥ 0. If f (d, ℓ (1) ) = 0, then either P = {y(d, ℓ)} in which case in Step 2 we return y(d, ℓ (1) ) as a solution to (P ), or A ⊤ y(d, ℓ) ≤ u in which case in Step 3 we call Procedure 2 to construct a type-L certificate of infeasibility.
In Steps 4-7, we compute updates
(23)
Lemma 6.2 establishes a few properties of these updates: Lemma 6.2. Let d > 0, and let ℓ be a certified lower bound for (P ) with certificate matrix Λ, and suppose that f (d, ℓ) = 1, and suppose in addition that λ j is also a certificate for the lower bound L j := a ⊤ j y(d, ℓ)−γ j (d, ℓ). Let ℓ (1) be defined as in (18), and suppose that f (d, ℓ (1) ) > 0. Let d (1) , ℓ (2) , d (2) , and d (3) be defined as in (21) (1) , ℓ (1) ) 2 e j . Remark 6.1. It is possible to show that the ellipsoid E(d (3) , ℓ (2) ) contains the half ellipsoid described by the intersection of the ellipsoid E(d (1) , ℓ (1) ) and the half-space {x ∈ R n : a ⊤ j x ≤ u j } = {x ∈ R n : a ⊤ j x ≤ a ⊤ j y(d (1) , ℓ (1) )}. The ellipsoid E(d (3) , ℓ (2) ) is not the minimum volume ellipsoid containing the half ellipsoid, but it would be if we substituted n for m in updates (22) and (23). We use m instead of n in order to establish a convergence guarantee for our algorithm in the setting in which (P ) is infeasible; we will clarify and elaborate on this idea in Section 7.1.
So far, we have separately studied the first step and the last four steps of the update procedure. Theorem 6.1 below provides a more unified perspective on the update procedure: Theorem 6.1. Let d > 0 and ℓ be a certified lower bound for (P ) with certificate matrix Λ, and suppose that f (d, ℓ) = 1. Let ℓ (1) be defined as in (18), and suppose that f (d, ℓ (1) ) > 0. Let d (1) , ℓ (2) , d (2) , and d (3) be defined as in (21), (22), (23), and (24) respectively. Then
where α(d, ℓ) > m 2 −1 m 2 . Remark 6.2. For those familiar with the ellipsoid algorithm and the Burrell-Todd representation, we now give some motivation for the steps in our update procedure. As we will describe in our convergence analysis, our aim is to guarantee some volume reduction, but at the same time achieve progress in the case of infeasibility. For this, we need to maintain the Burrell-Todd representation, but it appears we cannot push for aggressive volume reduction.
In the original ellipsoid algorithm, the quadratic inequality defining the new ellipsoid is the sum of that defining the old ellipsoid, say
and the multiple 2 (n − 1)a ⊤ j Ba j of the quadratic inequality
(see [11] ). However, since the old inequality was not in Burrell-Todd form, nor is the new one. In deep cut and two-sided cut variants, the old ellipsoid is given by a Burrell-Todd representation. After choosing the constraint j, the lower bound ℓ j is possibly updated, and if so, the old ellipsoid is also updated before again taking a combination of quadratic inequalities to define the new ellipsoid. In our version, this cannot be done without jeopardizing the analysis. Therefore, the first step is decreasing the lower bound ℓ j to ℓ (1) j so that the new center lies on the constraint a ⊤ j x = u j . Then the quadratic inequality defining the new ellipsoid is the sum of that defining the intermediate ellipsoid, (1) , ℓ (1) ) ≤ 1 , and the multiple 2 (m − 1)γ j (d (1) , ℓ (1) 
Note that, due to the common factor a ⊤ j (x − u j ), the terms d
j ) from the first inequality and
can be combined, and this leads to the updates for ℓ (2) and d (2) and the new Burrell-Todd representation.
Oblivious Ellipsoid Algorithm
A formal description of our oblivious ellipsoid algorithm (OEA) is presented in Algorithm 4; the description is essentially a more formal and detailed version of the schematic version of OEA presented in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 4 Oblivious Ellipsoid Algorithm (OEA)
Input: data (A, u), certified lower bound ℓ for (P ) with certificate matrix Λ, and d > 0. ℓ) , then update the certificate for constraint j:
8:
λ j ←λ j . 9: If L j > u j , then Return type-L certificate of infeasibilityλ j := λ j + e j and Stop. 10: Update E(d, ℓ) by updating ellipsoid parameters d and ℓ:
11:
Call Procedure 3 with input d, ℓ, Λ to obtain outputd,l. 12: Re-set (d, ℓ) ← (d,l) and Goto Step 1.
Let us briefly consider the steps of Algorithm 4 that are different from the steps of the schematic Algorithm 1. In Step 2 when f (d, ℓ) ≤ 0, we call Procedure 2 (see Section 5) to construct and return a type-L certificate of infeasibility. In Steps 5-8 we use Proposition 5.1 to update the certificate λ j when we can construct a new certificate that certifies a better lower bound (namely L j ). In Step 9 when L j > u j , we returnλ j , which is a type-L certificate of infeasibility by Corollary 5.1. Lastly, in Step 11, we use Procedure 3 (of Section 6) to update the ellipsoid by updating its parameters. 
Computational Guarantees when (P ) is Infeasible
In this subsection we examine the computational complexity of Algorithm 4 in the case when (P ) is infeasible. We start with the following elementary proposition that bounds the slab radii in terms of the (normalized) components of d. (Proofs of the results of Section 7 appear in Appendix C.3.)
It then follows from Proposition 5.2 and Proposition 7.1 that we can construct a type-L certificate of infeasibility if the entries of the normalized iterate 1 f (d,ℓ) d eventually become large enough so that they satisfy
In order to prove that this condition will eventually hold, we first introduce the following potential function φ(d, ℓ):
and we will show in this subsection that this potential function sufficiently decreases over the iterations in the case when (P ) is infeasible. For notational convenience, define , and suppose that d, ℓ,d,l satisfy:
With Lemma 7.1 in hand, we now state and prove our main computational guarantee for Algorithm 4 in the case when (P ) is infeasible. Theorem 7.1. Let ℓ ∈ R m be certified lower bounds for (P ) with certificate matrix Λ. Let d := e ∈ R m . If (P ) is infeasible, Algorithm 4 with input A, u, ℓ, Λ, and d will stop and return a type-L certificate of infeasibility in at most
iterations.
Proof. In the notation of the theorem d and ℓ are the initial values used as input to Algorithm 4. First note that if f (d, ℓ) ≤ 0, then it follows from Proposition 5.3 that Step 2 of Algorithm 4 will return a certificate of infeasibility of (P ) at the very first iteration. Also, if f (e, ℓ) < τ (A, u), then it follows from Proposition 7.1 that γ i (e, ℓ) < τ (A, u) for all i ∈ [m], whereby for the index j in Step 4 it holds that a j ⊤ y(d, ℓ) − u j ≥ τ (A, u) > γ j (e, ℓ) which implies that L j > u j in Step 9 of Algorithm 4, and so it follows from Corollary 5.1 that Algorithm 4 will return a certificate of infeasibility of (P ) at Step 9 of the very first iteration. We therefore suppose for the rest of the proof that f (e, ℓ) > 0 and f (e, ℓ) ≥ τ (A, u).
From the definition of the potential function, it therefore holds for the initial values of d = e and ℓ that φ(e, ℓ)
Suppose that Algorithm 4 has completed k iterations, and letd andl denote the values of d and ℓ upon completion of iteration k. It then follows from Lemma 7.1 that
where the first inequality uses the absolute lower bound on φ(·, ·) from its definition, and the second inequality uses Lemma 7.1. Taking logarithms of both sides and rearranging terms yields the inequality k ≤ 2m(m + 1) ln m+1 
Computational Guarantees when (P ) is Feasible
In this subsection we examine the computational complexity of Algorithm 4 in the case when (P ) is feasible. Our analysis is in some sense standard, in that we show that upon updating the values of d and ℓ in Procedure 3, the volume of the newly updated ellipsoid E(d, ℓ) decreases by a sufficient amount. For d ∈ R m ++ and ℓ ∈ R m satisfying f (d, ℓ) > 0, the (relative) volume of E(d, ℓ) is:
(relative in that it ignores the dimensional constant c n = π (n/2) Γ(n/2+1) ). Lemma 7.2 below states that after updating d and ℓ in Procedure 3, the volume of the ellipsoid E(d, ℓ) decreases by at least the multiplicative factor e − 1 2(m+1) . , and suppose that d, ℓ,d,l satisfy:
With Lemma 7.2 in hand, we now state and prove our main computational guarantee for Algorithm 4 in the case when (P ) is feasible. Note that the theorem uses the condition number ρ(A), which was introduced (16) and measures the distance to unboundedness as discussed earlier.
Theorem 7.2. Let ℓ ∈ R m be certified lower bounds for (P ) with certificate matrix Λ. Let d := e ∈ R m . If (P ) is feasible, Algorithm 4 with input A, u, ℓ, Λ, and d will stop and return a feasible solution of (P ) in at most
Proof. In the notation of the theorem d = e and ℓ are the initial values used as input to Algorithm 4. Let us first bound the volume of the initial ellipsoid E(d, ℓ) . From the bound on f (e, ℓ) in the proof of Theorem 7.1 we have:
vol E(d, ℓ) = (f (e, ℓ))
where the bound in the denominator above uses Proposition C.1. Suppose that Algorithm 4 has completed k iterations, and letd andl denote the values of d and ℓ upon completion of iteration k. Next notice that E(d,l) ⊃ P ⊃ B(c, τ (A, u)) for some c ∈ P where the second inclusion follows from Proposition 4.1. Therefore a lower bound on vol E(d,l) is τ (A, u) n . It then follows from Lemma 7.2 that
where the second inequality uses Lemma 7.1 and the third inequality uses the upper bound on vol E(d, ℓ). Taking logarithms of both sides and rearranging terms yields the inequality k ≤ 2n(m + 1) ln
which proves the result. Corollary 7.2 specializes Theorem 7.2 to instances of linear inequality systems with box constraints (P B ) from Section 2. The corollary follows from Theorem 7.2, inequality (11) , and the fact that if A ⊤ x ≤ u contains box constraints, then det AA ⊤ > 1 (and so ρ(A) vanishes in the guarantee).
Corollary 7.2. Consider the linear inequality system with box constraints (P B ), and let A, u, ℓ, and Λ be defined as in (7)- (10) . Let d := e ∈ R m . If (P B ) is feasible, Algorithm 4 with input A, u, ℓ, Λ, and d will stop and return a feasible solution of (P B ) in at most 2n(m + 1) ln √m
We conclude this section by pointing to the computational dimension complexity of OEA. Remark 7.1 states that the operations complexity of an iteration of OEA is O(m 2 ) operations. Combining this with the iteration complexity of Theorem 7.1 and Theorem 7.2 yields the computational dimension complexity bounds for OEA in the second row of Table 1 .
A Simplified Version of Algorithm OEA
In this section we describe a simpler version of our oblivious ellipsoid algorithm that rather surprisingly leads to a new complexity bound for the ellipsoid algorithm for Challenge II in the case when (P ) is infeasible. This simpler version does not iteratively update the information needed to produce a type-L certificate of infeasibility. It still proves infeasibility by correctly detecting infeasibility when (P ) is infeasible, but it does not produce a solution of (Alt), and hence we refer to it as algorithm OEA-No-Alt. This is all based on two rather elementary observations about OEA, as follows.
The first observation concerns the role of the updates of Λ in OEA. Observe that the certificate matrix Λ is never used anywhere in the computational rules in OEA nor in the updates of any objects other than Λ itself; these updates of Λ are pure "record-keeping" and their sole purpose is to eventually produce a Type-L certificate of infeasibility (a solution of (Alt)) after such infeasibility is detected and the algorithm needs no further iterations. Hence, if one is not interested in actually computing a solution of (Alt), any and all updates of Λ can be omitted. By omitting the updates of Λ the algorithm will no longer produce a solution of (Alt) in the case when (P ) is infeasible, and hence we denote this simplified version of OEA as OEA-No-Alt. Nevertheless the updated values of Λ exist (but are just not computed). A somewhat formal description of OEA-No-Alt is as follows: Last of all, the computational dimension complexity bounds for OEA-No-Alt in the third row of Table 1 follow directly from the above observations. Appendices A Connection between τ (A, u) and Renegar's distance to ill-posednessρ(d)
The paper [8] by Renegar develops a rather complete data-perturbation-theoretic condition measure theory for conic optimization using a data-dependent measureρ that is naturally tied to a variety of geometric, analytic, numerical, and algorithmic properties of conic optimization problems. We will show below that τ (A, u) ≥ρ(A, u), but first we need to establish the setting and then give a formal definition ofρ.
The condition measureρ is concerned with data-instance-specific conic systems and their state changes as the data is perturbed. Restricting our discussion to the case of linear inequality systems of the form (P ), let us define the data d = (A, u) ∈ R n×m × R m and P d := P A,u := {x ∈ R n : A ⊤ x ≤ u}. (We slightly abuse notation in calling the data d in order to be consistent with the notation used in the condition measure theory.) The feasible and infeasible data instances are then defined as F := {d ∈ R n×m × R m : P d = ∅} and I := {d ∈ R n×m × R m : P d = ∅}. We will define the following norm on the data: d := (A, u) := max{ A 1,2 , u ∞ } where recall that the operator norm of a matrix M is M 1,2 = max v 1 =1 Mv 2 . The condition measureρ(d) is then defined as:
which is essentially the size of the smallest data perturbation ∆d = (∆A, ∆u) for which P d+∆d changes from nonempty to empty, or vice versa.ρ(d) is called the "distance to illposedness" because the optimal or nearly-optimal perturbed data d + ∆d lies on the set of ill-posed instances ∂F = ∂I. It is simple to show thatρ(d) and τ (A, u) are related as follows: 
B Two Update Formulas
Propositions B.1 and B.2 below are straightforward results that follow from the Sherman-Morrison formula and algebraic manipulation.
and
Proof. For notational convenience, we suppress the dependence on d and l in the quantities y(·, ·), t(·, ·), and f (·, ·), and we write y for y(d, ℓ) andỹ for y(d, ℓ) = y(d + δe j , ℓ), and similarly for t and f ; we also write B for B(d) andB for B(d). Let θ := δ 1+δγ j (d,ℓ) 2 . From the Sherman-Morrison formula, (26) holds, and hencẽ
It follows from (29) thatt = A ⊤ỹ − r = t − θt j A ⊤ B −1 a j , and thus we have (27). Hence,
where the second equality follows from ADt = 0. Also,
From (30) and (31),
and thus (28) holds.
Proof. For notational convenience, we suppress the dependence on d and l in the quantities y(·, ·), t(·, ·), f (·, ·), r(·, ·), and v(·, ·), and we write y for y(d, ℓ) andỹ for y(d,l) = y(d, ℓ+βe j ), and similarly for t, f , r, and v; we also write B for B(d). Becauser = r + (β/2)e j ,
Thus, equation (32) holds. From (32),
and so equation (33) holds. It follows from (33) that
where the second equality is from
From (35) and (36),
and thus (34) holds.
C Proofs of Results

C.1 Proofs for Section 5
Proof of Proposition 5.1. We need to show thatλ i and L i satisfy (LB i ). First note that
where the second equality follows from AΛ = −A. Also note that
where the second equality follows from ADt(d, ℓ) = 0 and the definition of B(d). From (37) and (38), it holds that Aλ i = −a i , and so it remains to verify that −λ ⊤ i u ≥ L i . For notational convenience, define
and note thatλ i = γ i (d, ℓ)D(A ⊤ z − r(ℓ)). Also, for each j ∈ [m], define
and observe that if (λ i ) j = 0 (so d j = 0 and a ⊤ j z = r j (ℓ)), then
.
Now if (λ i ) j > 0, then sgn((λ i ) j ) = sgn(a ⊤ j z − r j (ℓ)), and it follows from multiplying (39) by (λ i ) j that
Similarly if (λ i ) j < 0, then sgn((λ i ) j ) = sgn(a ⊤ j z − r j (ℓ)), and it follows from multiplying (40) by (λ i ) j that
Finally, if (λ i ) j = 0, then either d j = 0 in which case µ j = 0, or a ⊤ j z = r j (ℓ) in which case
Thus from the above we obtain:
where the second equality follows from (38) and the third equality follows from the fact that z satisfies the inequality defining E(d, ℓ) with equality. Rearranging (41) yields
where the second inequality follows from −Λ ⊤ u ≥ ℓ andλ − i ≥ 0. Proof of Proposition 5.3. Examining Step 1 of Procedure 2, we see from Remark 1.1 thatλ j is a type-L certificate of infeasibility if ℓ j > u j . If the procedure does not exit at Step 1, it holds that 1 2 (u − ℓ) = v(ℓ) ≥ 0. And from the discussion of Procedure 2 directly preceding Proposition 5.3,λ k := λ k + e k is a type-L certificate of infeasibility as long as Steps 2 -11 of Procedure 2 can be executed as stipulated. The only steps that require proof of such viability are Steps 2, 4, 5, and 6.
C.2 Proofs for Section 6
For notational convenience we define:
Note that ℓ (1) = ℓ + β (1) e j and ℓ (2) 
Proof of Lemma 6.1. Observe that
and so ℓ (1) j < ℓ j and hence ℓ (1) ≤ ℓ, whereby ℓ (1) is a lower bound for (P ) with certificate matrix Λ since Λ is a certificate matrix for ℓ and ℓ (1) ≤ ℓ. From (32) with β = β (1) we have: a ⊤ j y(d, ℓ (1) ) = a ⊤ j y(d, ℓ)
which shows (19). And from (34) with β = β (1) we have: f (d, ℓ (1) ) = 1 + β (1) (t j (d, ℓ) − v j (ℓ))d j + 1 4 (β (1) ) 2 d 2 j γ j (d, ℓ) 2
which demonstrates the equality in (20). The inequality in (20) follows since j is the index of a violated constraint, hence a ⊤ j y(d, ℓ) > u j .
Proof of Lemma 6.2. We first prove item (a). First suppose that β (2) ≤ 0. Then
where the strict inequality uses (42). Next suppose that β (2) > 0. Then β (2) ≤ 2v j (ℓ (1) ) − γ j (d (1) , ℓ (1) ), and therefore ℓ
j ≤ ℓ
j + 2v j (ℓ (1) ) − γ j (d (1) , ℓ (1) ) = u j − 2v j (ℓ (1) ) + 2v j (ℓ (1) ) − γ j (d (1) , ℓ (1) ) = a ⊤ j y(d, ℓ (1) ) − γ j (d (1) , ℓ (1) ) ,
where the last equality follows from (19) . Also note that γ j (d, ℓ (1) ) = f (d, ℓ (1) ) 1 2 (a ⊤ j B(d) −1 a j )
From the invariance of γ j (·, ℓ (1) ) under positive scaling of the first argument, a ⊤ j y(d, ℓ) − γ j (d, ℓ) − a ⊤ j y(d, ℓ (1) ) − γ j (d (1) , ℓ (1) ) = γ j (d, ℓ (1) ) − γ j (d, ℓ) + a ⊤ j y(d, ℓ) − a ⊤ j y(d, ℓ (1) ) = f (d, ℓ (1) )
where the second equality follows from (19) and (45), the third equality uses (43), and the inequality from the fact that √ 1 − x 2 ≥ 1 − x for any scalar 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. Therefore a ⊤ j y(d, ℓ (1) ) − γ j (d (1) , ℓ (1) ) ≤ a ⊤ j y(d, ℓ) − γ j (d, ℓ) ,
and (44) and (46) combine to yield
which completes the proof of (a). Next, (b) is immediate since f (d (1) , ℓ (1) ) = 1 from (21). Finally, we prove (c). We need to prove that f (d (2) , ℓ (2) ) = m 2 m 2 − 1 = 1 + 1 m 2 − 1 .
Note that f (d (2) , ℓ (2) ) = f (d (1) , ℓ (1) ) + [f (d (2) , ℓ (1) ) − f (d (1) , ℓ (1) )] + [f (d (2) , ℓ (2) ) − f (d (2) , ℓ (1) )] = 1 + [f (d (2) , ℓ (1) ) − 1] + [f (d (2) , ℓ (2) ) − f (d (2) , ℓ (1) )] .
We now proceed to evaluate the two terms in brackets. For notational convenience let y (1) = y(d (1) , ℓ (1) ) , t (1) = t(d (1) , ℓ (1) ) , γ = γ j (d (1) , ℓ (1) ) , v (1) j = v j (ℓ (1) ) , r (1) j = r j (ℓ (1) ) , B = B(d (1) ) .
Then from Proposition B.1 with δ = 2/[(m − 1)γ 2 ] and θ = δ/(1 + δγ 2 ), we have B(d (2) ) −1 = B −1 − θB −1 a j a T j B −1 , and so a ⊤ j B(d (2) ) −1 a j = γ 2 − θγ 4 = 1 1 + δγ 2 γ 2 = m − 1 m + 1 γ 2 .
Also, t(d (2) , ℓ (1) ) = t (1) − θt (1) j A T B −1 a j , and so t j (d (2) , ℓ (1) ) = t (1)
j . Lastly, f (d (2) , ℓ (1) 
From the invariance of y(·, ℓ (1) ) under positive scaling and (19), it holds that
and so f (d (2) , ℓ (1) 
Next, from Proposition B.2, we have f (d (2) , ℓ (2) )−f (d (2) , ℓ (1) ) = β (2) (t j (d (2) , ℓ (1) 
Note that from the definition of d (2) j and β (2) , it follows that
We can now evaluate the terms in (51).
Since t j (d (2) , ℓ (1) ) = m−1 m+1 t (1)
j , the first term on the right-hand side is
The second term on the right-hand side is equal to
Combining these terms and substituting them in (51) gives f (d (2) , ℓ (2) ) − f (d (2) , ℓ (1) ) = − 4 (m 2 − 1)γ 2 (v because 0 < f (d, ℓ (1) ) < 1 using the hypothesis of the theorem and Lemma 6.1. From the invariance of γ j (·, ℓ (1) ) under positive scaling of the first argument, it holds that: γ j (d (1) , ℓ (1) ) 2 = γ j (d, ℓ (1) ) 2 = f (d, ℓ (1) )γ j (d, ℓ) 2 .
(52)
The result now follows from (21) and Lemma 6.2 (c).
Together these establish (54). Thus from (53) We now prove (55) by contradiction. Suppose that the claim is false. Then there exists v with v = 1 and 0 < α < 1 satisfying A ⊤v ≤ αρ(A)e. Define ∆A := −αρ(A)ve ⊤ and note that (A + ∆A) ⊤ (−v) = −A ⊤v + αρ(A)v ⊤v e ≥ −αρ(A)e + αρ(A)e = 0 , and so from the definition of ρ(A) in (16) it must hold that ∆A 1,2 ≥ ρ(A). However, it is simple to verify that ∆A 1,2 = − αρ(A)ve ⊤ 1,2 = αρ(A) < ρ(A) which provides the desired contradiction, establishing (55).
